Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63313/crispp.9002Keywords:
Adverbialism, Ontology of color, Plastic philosophy, Psychology of perception, Cognitive-visual experienceAbstract
What is color? Is it an aspect of the world or our minds? Although it may seem superficial and immediate given our everyday experience of color, philosophical scrutiny has uncovered deep ambiguities. Physicalism takes color to be physical, whereas anti-realism assimilates colors to a mass-spread projection of subjec-tivity. However, neither account adequately accounts for the empirical com-plexity of color perception. In this paper I return to the ontology of color and provide an account of adverbialism, the idea that color is not something that is sensed but a way of sensing.
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