Influence of power battery improvement on the choice of competition and cooperation strategy of electric vehicle manufacturers
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63313/AERpc.9033Keywords:
game model, investment efficiency, coopetition strategy, profit maximizationAbstract
Under the background of process improvement of electric vehicle power bat-tery, this paper explores the impact of different competition and cooperation strategies of electric vehicle manufacturers on the pricing and profits of electric vehicle manufacturers. A system model including two electric vehicle manufac-turers (one with power battery technology and one without power battery technology) and a battery manufacturer with only power battery technology is constructed. The model is solved by using the inverse method, and the influence of factors such as power battery investment efficiency on the manufacturer's strategy selection is analyzed. The results show that: with the increase of in-vestment efficiency of suppliers, the investment effect of manufacturers with power battery technology decreases, regardless of the competition mode or the cooperation mode; Manufacturers with power battery technology usually have higher profits in the competition and cooperation mode than in the competition mode. The mode choice of manufacturers who lack power battery technology is affected by investment efficiency: when the investment efficiency is high, they tend to choose the competition and cooperation mode; When the investment efficiency is low, it tends to be competitive.
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