Enhancement of Government Audit Independence and Standardization of State-Owned Enterprises: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on the Reform of the Management System for Personnel, Finance, and Materials at the Sub-Provincial Level

Xinying Zhu

doi:10.63313/EBM.9114

Authors

Xinying Zhu School of Accounting, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63313/EBM.9114

Keywords:

Audit Management System Reform, State-Owned Enterprises, Corporate Violations

Abstract

This study takes the 2015 reform of unified management of personnel, finance, and materials in local audit institutions below the provincial level (implemented in 7 provinces/municipalities in China) as a quasi-natural experiment. It empirically tests the impact of this audit management system reform on the standardized operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that after the reform, the violation behaviors of local SOEs in the pilot areas decreased significantly. Further analysis reveals that the reform mainly restrains information disclosure violations and leader-related violations. This study provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the audit management system reform at the sub-provincial level, enriches the literature on audit independence, and offers insights for the deepening of future policies.

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