Strategies for Enhancing the Adaptability of Skilled Talents from the Perspective of Five Party Game Theory

Abstract

Against the backdrop of rapid industrial technological iteration and the vigorous cultivation of new quality productive forces, a persistent systemic time lag exists between the cultivation of highly skilled talents and the evolving demands of the enterprises. This disconnect manifests in acute structural contradictions, including the inability to apply learned knowledge and a significant readiness gap upon graduation. To address this core issue, this study constructs a five-party evolutionary game model encompassing schools, enterprises, students, parents, and the government. The analysis reveals that the current dilemma in career adaptability stems from the system being trapped in a low-level Nash equilibrium, characterized by misaligned incentives among stakeholders. To break this suboptimal equilibrium, we propose an incentive-compatible four-dimensional governance framework. This framework necessitates precise institutional supply and risk-sharing mechanisms from the government, efficient channels for transmitting industrial demand signals, the empowerment of schools, students, and parents as active co-creators, and the development of a digital twin-supported training ecosystem to reduce adaptive cultivation costs. By systematically recalibrating the payoff functions within the five-party game, this framework aims to shift the system from a vicious cycle of mutual constraint toward a virtuous cycle of synergistic co-governance.